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BACKGROUND

Based on Stipulated Facts, the district court found that Mr. Crawley violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct. After oral argument, the court imposed a one year
suspension, stayed the suspension and imposed an eighteen month probation with strict
conditions including psychological counseling and requirement to refrain from all
litigation. Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Discipline, In re
Crawley, Civil No. 040905620. The district court based its decision that probation was
the correct discipline on its analysis using factors from Rule 3.1 and Rule 6.2 of the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The district court first determined the duty
violated, finding that Mr. Crawley violated rules of competence, scope of representation,
diligence, and communication. (R. 2); Rule 3.1(a); Conclusions of Law, In re Crawley.
The court also directly asked Mr. Crawley several questions regarding his mental state at
the time of the misconduct. (R. 55-59); Rule 3.1(b). The court looked to mitigating and
aggravating factors under Rule 3.1(d). The court determined that the misconduct
occurred on multiple occasions, and multiple elements of dishonesty, and that Mr.
Crawley had substantial experience. (R. 91). Also under 3.1(d) the court found that Mr.
Crawley was suffering from physical, personal, and emotional problems; restitution was
made albeit after the fact; he enjoys a good character in the community; he showed
substantial remorse; and he suffered a personal loss of about $150,000 because of his
conduct. After considering all the applicable factors under Rule 3.1, the court decided
Mr. Crawley should receive a stayed suspended and placed on probation. (R. 91-101).

1

II.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

If the Court desires to adopt Petitioner's rules foreclosing probation in certain
situations, it would best be done through a prospective rulemaking rather than a judicial
decision. No jurisdiction anywhere has ever suggested Petitioner's rules. These rules
would be contrary to many Utah disciplinary dispositions, supersede Rule 3 of the
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, and tie the hands of this Court and district
courts in dealing with attorney disciplinary matters.
Without this rule, it is left to the judgment of this Court to determine the
correctness of the district court's decision. Imposition of probation is consistent with the
way this Court, and many other courts, handle acts of intentional dishonesty when the
acts are closely related to severe mental, physical, and emotional distress. The conditions
of Mr. Crawley's probation are closely related to the misconduct, protect the public,
protect the legal profession, and offer the greatest opportunity for Mr. Crawley to be
successful in the future. The Court need not disturb the findings and order of the district
court.
III.

A.

ARGUMENT

IF THE COURT SEES FIT TO IMPOSE NEW RULES LIMITING
GRANTS OF PROBATION, A RULEMAKING WOULD BE MORE
APPROPRIATE.

Under principles announced by the U.S. Supreme Court, if the Court agrees with
Petitioner's proposed rules, the rules should be adopted through a prospective rule rather
than by judicial decision. Lawyer discipline proceedings are not administrative nor are

they criminal, but this Court has often used principles from other contexts to deal with a
new disciplinary question. For example, Justices have used principles concerning capital
punishment to guide their thinking about disbarment proceedings. In re Johnson, 48 P.3d
881, 887 (Utah 2001) (Durham, concurring and dissenting). The Court has also
compared the attorney discipline process to administrative proceedings. In re Babilis,
951 P.2d 207, 214 (Utah 1997) (Comparing attorney discipline proceedings to driver's
license revocation process to determine that penalties available under the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions are not punishment for double jeopardy purposes).
Principles of administrative law may be applicable in this case.
In this case, Petitioner asks the Court to make and apply a new rule. In SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), the Supreme Court offered guidance for a situation
where a rulemaking or decision could formulate a policy.1 The reasoning of Chenery
would disfavor making rules by a judicially adopted policy. Chenery explains that the
rulemaking-adjudication decision often involves a balancing of (1) retroactive effects of a
judicially announced policy against (2) the "mischief of producing a result which is
contrary to a statutory design or to legal and equitable principles." 332 U.S. at 203. If
mischief of a result contrary to statutory design exceeds the mischief of retroactive
effects of a judicial decision announcing a policy, and an agency chooses to make a
1

Chenery compares rulemakings and adjudications where the rule to be made involves a
matter of first impression. We take the position that the rule articulated by petitioner is
not a matter of first impression because it would directly contradict several prior
disciplinary dispositions of this Court. See infra, pp. 12-21. The preference for a
rulemaking should be even stronger in a case where a policy such as the one suggested by
petitioner would reverse this Court and retroactively apply the new policy to the current
respondents.
3

policy through adjudication, it is not the type of retroactivity that is condemned by law.
If the mischief from a judicially announced policy is greater than an isolated result
contrary to statutory design, and the decision maker chooses to make policy through a
judicial decision, that action is "condemned by law." Id.
Utah has a statute that takes into account the mental state of an attorney who
violates the rules of intentional conduct, Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions. That Rule also takes into account aggravating and mitigating factors, the duty
violated, the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct. Under the
reasoning in Chenery, there is no support for Petitioner's request to formulate a policy by
a retroactive decision. Petitioner does not assert that probation is a result contrary to
statutory design or to legal or equitable principles. Indeed, there is much support given
within this brief that probation is in harmony with statutory design and legal principles.
See infra, pp. 12-21. Any rule suggested by Petitioner would be "condemned by law" if
applied retroactively against respondent because there is no "mischief to balance it
against. Petitioner advocates a position that would be contrary to statutory and legal
principles because their position would effectively rewrite Rule 3 of the Standards and go
against many cases where this Court has imposed probation.
Even if the principles in Chenery do not bind this Court, those principles can
certainly guide the decision making process. Should the Court decide now is the time to
impose a bright line rule foreclosing probation in certain circumstances, this would be
best accomplished by adding a new, prospective rule to the Standards rather than
retroactively applying this rule against Mr. Crawley.
A

B.

THOUGH JURISDICTIONS HAVE VARYING STANDARDS FOR
IMPOSING PROBATION, NO JURISDICTION HAS ADOPTED THE
STANDARD PROPOSED BY THE PETITIONER.

c

Probation is different from other sanctions. Though listed as a "sanction" in the
Standards, the legislature has identified that in some contexts, probation is "an act of
grace by the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1. Misunderstanding probation to be a
lesser punishment, Petitioner argues in favor of a rule permitting courts to grant this "act
of grace" only when a defendant unknowingly or negligently violates the rules.
Petitioner's Brief p.28. Probation is not just a slap on the wrist. When considering a
period of probation for an attorney respondent, the D.C. court has reasoned that "a
lengthy period of probation in addition to, or even in lieu of, a shorter period of
suspension may amount to a greater, not a lesser, sanction." In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627
(D.C. 1989).2
In the current case, Mr. Crawley's probation is longer in duration than the
suspension requested by Petitioner. (R. 92). The probation requires him to take more
active steps toward reform than a suspension would. (R. 104). The terms are directly
related to the conditions leading to the misconduct, (R. 104), the conditions are tough, (R.
91-92), and probation was, in the district court's opinion, the best way to protect the
public and the legal profession. (R. 93).
While there is a strong basis for the district court's action, there is no support for
Petitioner's position that probation should be per se unavailable to courts in cases of
2

In Peek the court was responding to the D.C. Bar Discipline Board's concern that
probation was a much greater punishment than the suspension the Bar sought.
5

intentional dishonest conduct by an attorney. There is also no support for the position
that probation should be unavailable to courts in all cases where particular aggravating
factors are present. District courts and the Supreme Court have always judged the
appropriateness of certain punishments, and there is no reason to take away that judicial
discretion.
a. THE OPC DOES NOT CITE TO ANY "SPECIFIED CONDITIONS"
THAT MUST BE MET FOR COURTS TO IMPOSE PROBATION.
In its brief the OPC states, "Jurisdictions with rules permitting probation often
identify conditions that must be satisfied before probation can be imposed." Petitioner's
Brief p. 14. The only condition that Petitioner identifies is that probation should be
imposed if there is little likelihood of harm to the public. Id. The clear purpose of
attorney discipline is to protect the public. From inception to disposition, the handling of
every complaint received by the Bar should accomplish this objective, and is not a
condition unique to probation. It should be up to this Court to determine when probation
is an appropriate tool to protect the public.
At trial the district court considered suspension and probation. The judge
determined that an eighteen-month probation including specific restrictions on Mr.
Crawley's ability to practice litigation, court ordered psychological monitoring, and
publication of the discipline would protect the public. The ultimate decision over this
matter lies with this Court, but it is respondent's position that the trial court's order need
not be disturbed and is adequate to protect the public.

b. RULE 3 ALREADY REQUIRES COURTS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
MENTAL STATE AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS.
Under the Standards for Imposing Disciplinary Sanctions, a
respondent's mental state in committing acts of misconduct, the type of conduct, and the
aggravating factors are all matters that should be considered in determining the correct
sanctions for attorneys. Rule 3, Standards. No one factor is dispositive. Intentional acts
are obviously worse than negligent acts, great injury is worse than no injury, and the
presence of aggravating factors is worse than no aggravating factors. Petitioner's rule,
brought to this court with no legal authority whatsoever, would essentially rewrite Rule 3,
taking away from district courts and the Supreme Courts the ability to consider all factors
when imposing discipline.
c. REPORTED CASES FROM UTAH AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS
OFFER NO SUPPORT FOR PETITIONER'S POSITION AND DO NOT
DISFAVOR PROBATION.
Petitioner turns to other jurisdictions to provide perspective on the appropriateness
of probation in the attorney discipline process, citing a number of cases where attorneys
who committed offenses that would ordinarily warrant disbarment were granted or denied
probation. It should first be pointed out that most of these cases involve fundamentally
different kinds of acts from those committed by Mr. Crawley, including misappropriation
of client funds or lack of candor to a tribunal. This is not a good comparison.
Misappropriation of funds always falls under Rule 4.2 of the Standards and is
presumptively grounds for disbarment. In re Johnson, 48 P.3d at 885. As will be shown
below, this is not the case here. Many of the cases involved more serious misconduct,
7

but still resulted in shorter periods of probation with less restrictive probationary
conditions.
Rule 4.2 of the Standard for imposing Lawyer Discipline requires that in order to
presumptively warrant disbarment, a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct must
cause "serious or potentially serious injury to a party, the public, or the legal system, or
causes serious or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding." At no point
has any party or any court suggested that the conduct in this case, or the conduct in
similar cases in other jurisdictions, meets that standard, nor suggested that disbarment
was appropriate for Mr. Crawley.3 By contrast, the conditions of 4.2 are presumptively
met in many of the cases Petitioner uses in pages 15-19 of its brief to "offer useful
perspective on probation as a disciplinary sanction." See, In re Discipline ofEnnenga, 37
P.3d 1150, 1153-54 (Utah 2001) (In cases involving misappropriation of client funds,
disbarment is the presumptive sanction). Despite the legal difference between the most
serious offenses like stealing from a client and less serious conduct, such as lying to
evade blame while suffering from chronic anxiety, Petitioner compares the two as if they
are the same act, warranting the same punishment.
The first case cited by OPC, In re Jantz, 763 P.2d 626 (Kan. 1998) involved an
attorney who withdrew $8,534.61 from a client trust account and converted the funds to
his personal use. The attorney proceeded to conceal this from his client. Mr. Jantz also
repeatedly lied about the misconduct to the client and to the judge. Jantz did not repay
3

OPC requested suspension, defendant requested a stayed suspension with probation,
and the court ordered suspension, stayed the suspension, and placed Mr. Crawley on
probation.

the funds until a court order was entered compelling him to do so. In deciding to grant
Jantz probation rather than disbarment, the court considered Jantz's emotional and family
problems. The court also considered the defendant's contrition and subsequent changes
in the circumstances of his legal practice in determining that probation was appropriate.
Attempting to isolate Jantz, Petitioner compares Jantz to In re Scimeca, 962 P.2d
1080 (Kan. 1998), a case where the Kansas Supreme Court did not grant probation. In
that case the respondent attorney was charged and found guilty of 12 counts of
unprofessional conduct including fraud, lying, billing violations, and failing to return
client expense deposits. Id. at 1081. The trial court did not believe the respondent
attorney felt remorse for his actions. Id. at 1087. The case does not discuss the exact
dates of the various acts of misconduct, but it seems clear from reading the case that the
misconduct occurred over a long period of time. The Kansas court simply determined
that Scimeca's discipline did not share sufficient similarity to Jantz to grant probation.
Id.
Moving to New Hampshire, Petitioner next discusses In re Morgan, 727 A.2d 985
(N.H. 1999). In that case the respondent attorney failed repeatedly to cover shortages in
client trust funds. Id. at 986. The respondent had been referred to the New Hampshire
Supreme Court once before and the court ordered him to establish a satisfactory trust
management program. Id. Under the supervision of the New Hampshire Bar's discipline
committee, respondent still systematically failed to comply with proper standards for trust
management. Id. This continued over a seventeen-month period. Id. The Supreme
Court still granted the respondent an opportunity, in the form of a sixty day probationary
9

period, to rectify the situation before it would impose a suspension. Id. at 987. New
Hampshire found that Morgan's ameliorative conduct and acceptance of responsibility
mitigated in favor of leniency. Id. The New Hampshire Supreme Court acknowledges,
like in Utah, if an attorney misappropriated funds with dishonest intent rather than
negligence, disbarment would be the presumptive sanction.4 Id.
Petitioner also cites two Oregon cases to provide perspective on probation. In re
Butler, 921 P.2d 401 (Ore. 1996) and In re Obert, 89 P.3d 1173 (Ore. 2004), are both
cases where the Oregon Supreme Court declined to grant probation to a respondent
attorney. In Butler the court indicated that it might grant probation if the attorney had
demonstrated any nexus between his mental and emotional problems and the
misrepresentations made to the client. 921 P.2d at 404. Mr. Butler failed repeatedly to
file or correct his negligent handling of a personal injury matter such that his client was
left with no cause of action, at the same time misrepresenting the status of the case to his
client. Id. at 403. The Oregon Court found it important that the negligence by Butler
occurred while Butler was aware that he was already under investigation for other acts of
attorney misconduct and evidenced a pattern of misconduct, and that the conduct
occurred with relation to multiple clients over a ten-year period. Id. at 405. Nonetheless,
the Oregon court said probation might be an acceptable outcome if conditions of
probation attach in a way that prevents the same type of misconduct in the future. Id.

4

Again, misappropriation of funds motivated by dishonesty would presumptively
warrant disbarment in any jurisdiction.
m

In Obert the Oregon Supreme Court dismissed probation as a possible outcome
where an attorney violated several different types of rules of professional conduct. One
concern was that where the violations were so widespread and occurred over a long
period of time, it would be very onerous to supervise the respondent while on probation.
Also, Obert was a relatively new attorney at the time of the misconduct and it appears
that he began violating rules of professional conduct almost immediately upon his
acceptance to the Oregon Bar, and in relation to many different clients. Id. at 1175.
The present case is distinguishable from the Oregon cases in every relevant way.
There is significant evidence in the record showing that Mr. Crawley's behavior is
closely connected to physical and mental conditions, namely diabetes and depression.
This condition has now been diagnosed, and his progress and stability can be monitored.
Indeed, one term of the probation imposed by the court is that Mr. Crawley continues to
have his mental and physical health monitored by trained professionals. (Record p. 1045). Significant factors in Mr. Crawley's favor include that his conduct took place over a
shorter period of time, did not involve several clients, and is a blip on the radar when
compared to his 28 year, discipline free career as an attorney. (R. p.93-94).
OPC next turns to an analysis of Minnesota law regarding probation. In the case
In re McCallum, 289 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980), an attorney came before the Minnesota
Supreme Court for, among other things, failure to file income tax returns. Minnesota
held in prior attorney discipline cases that an attorney's failure to file personal income tax
returns is almost always grounds for disbarment or suspension. The Court says:

11

In [a previous case] we said that the appropriate sanction for an attorney's failure
to file personal income tax returns is suspension or disbarment. We noted,
however, that ff(t)he alternative of granting probation is still reserved by this court
in the future, but it will be allowed in only the most extreme, extenuating
circumstances." (Citation omitted). There are circumstances sufficient to justify
probation as a sanction in this case.
Id. at 147 (emphasis added). It is obvious that Minnesota is not, as the Office of
Professional Conduct claims, saying that it will almost never grant probation.
Petitioner's Brief p. 18. Rather, where they have intentionally created a strong
presumption in favor of suspension or disbarment in a particular type of case, they would
deviate from that presumption only in the most extreme, extenuating circumstances.
Furthermore, the "extreme, extenuating circumstances" described in McCallum
closely mirror the mitigating factors in Mr. Crawley's case. Id. The respondent in
McCallum gradually developed a condition, not specifically identified in the opinion,
between 1962 and 1977. Id. As a result of that condition he developed severe
depression, much like Mr. Crawley. Id. He claimed the condition led to his failure to
pay income taxes for two years, and caused him to negligently execute his duties as
administrator of an estate and guardian of an incompetent child. Id. Mr. McCallum pled
guilty to the crime of filing late income taxes. Though McCallum claimed a causal
connection between his illness and his misconduct, that court pointed out that the
condition was not so serious as to impair his ability to represent other clients. Id.
Even if the OPC's interpretation of Minnesota's law were correct, their brief
identified several factors from McCallum that are also present for Mr. Crawley; physical
illness causally related to the misconduct (Record p.94), the damage has been remedied

1n

{Id.\ significant community contributions {Id. at 91), and no Bar disciplinary history {Id.
at 97).
Finally the OPC looks at Probation in the District of Columbia. The OPC
correctly quotes the D.C. Court of Appeals saying that probation is imposed infrequently,
but fails to point out that one circumstance where probation is appropriate and may
frequently be imposed in that jurisdiction is when an attorney's depression is directly
related to the misconduct. In re Bradbury, 608 A.2d 1218, 1219 (D.C. 1992).
In fact, the D.C. Circuit seems to agree exactly with respondent's position and has
made some excellent observations regarding probation in attorney discipline matters. For
example, probation is not necessarily a light punishment, and should not be viewed as a
reprieve or slap on the wrist. Peek, 565 A.2d at 634. Peek involves conduct and
conditions similar to Mr. Crawley's, though that attorney's conduct involved repeated
lies, extended to clients and other attorneys, took place over a longer period of time, and
resulted in greater damage to the client. Like Crawley, Mr. Peek introduced evidence
from mental health experts testifying along the same lines as Dr. Johnson testified for Mr.
Crawley. Compare Id. at 629-30, with (Record p.72-78). After considering similar
factors to factors in the instant case, the D.C. Circuit held as follows:
"We conclude, second, that when, as in this case, the respondent himself proffers
evidence of chronic depression at the time of the alleged misconduct and consents
to the recommended probation we can appropriately approve an extended,
supervised period of probation in lieu of all or part of a shorter period of
suspension."
Peek, 565 A.2d at 634.

13

These cases do, as Petitioner asserts, provide valuable perspective on
administering probation in lawyer discipline settings. While there may be isolated
language here or there that favors Petitioner's position, the general rules laid out in each
of these cases do not support the rules proposed to this court. Regardless of the rule
adopted, these cases do not point to any rule that would foreclose probation for the
present case. Instead, each case strongly supports the decision by the district court and
should guide the court in upholding that decision.
d. COURTS DO NOT NEED HARD FAST RULES ON WHEN
PROBATION IS APPROPRIATE.
Courts in Utah have long been allowed to offer defendants in criminal and
administrative proceedings probation instead of imposing the statutory penalty for a
crime or regulatory violation. After lengthy analysis of the authority cited by Petitioner,
no support can be found there for its position of imposing hard and fast rules governing
probation. Utah courts deal with probation in many other contexts, all of which are
helpful in deciding when probation might be an acceptable outcome for attorneys. Just
because there is not a set of guidelines telling courts exactly when and where probation is
appropriate in attorney discipline proceedings, this does not mean courts are running wild
and need their hands tied.
Probation is available to courts in dozens of administrative, civil, and criminal
contexts. There is exactly one circumstance where the Utah Legislature has deemed
necessary to give courts strict guidelines on when they must impose probation, and only a
few where the legislature has foreclosed probation. When a person receives a first

conviction for driving while intoxicated, the person must automatically receive probation
if his blood alcohol level exceeds .16. Utah Code Ann. §41-6a-505. Even though
probation is available for misconduct or criminal activities by such professionals as
private investigators, (Utah Code Ann. § 53-9-103), bail bondsmen, (Utah Code Ann. §
53-11-103), licensed educators, (Utah Code Ann. § 53A-6-306), public school students,
(Utah Code Ann. § 53 A-11-904), interpreters for the hearing impaired, (Utah Code Ann.
§ 53A-26a-401), architects, (Utah Code Ann. § 58-3a-502), podiatrists, (Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-5a-401), optometrists, (Utah Code Ann. § 58-16a-401), pharmacists, (Utah Code
Ann. § 58-17b-504), engineers, (Utah Code Ann. § 58-22-401), certified public
accountants, (Utah Code Ann. § 58-26a-401), veterinarians, (Utah Code Ann. § 58-28401), dozens of other regulated professions, juvenile offenders, (Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a103), and criminal defendants (Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-1), virtually no guidance is given
to trial courts and administrative agencies as to precisely when probation should be
imposed. There are only ten crimes for which criminal defendants are per se ineligible to
receive a suspended sentence and probation if the probation would shorten a prison
sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-406.
It is telling that out of all the different areas where probation can be applied, the
only place where a per se rule of mandatory probation is applied is one where a line can
easily be drawn based on blood alcohol content. Per se rules foreclosing probation are
based on guilt or innocence. The seriousness of attorney misconduct cannot be measured
by an arbitrary numerical cutoff. In some circumstances, such as felony convictions,
guilt or innocence may be an appropriate cutoff. It cannot honestly be Petitioner's
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opinion that all attorneys who say anything dishonest, regardless of the context, should be
suspended. The line between intentional acts and knowing acts is a bright line, but it is a
bright line that does not have any legal basis other than Petitioner's opinion. Courts may
grant probation for such intentional acts as assault, DWI with a blood alcohol content
under .16, kidnapping, or innumerable others. Even if probation is highly unlikely for
some of those crimes, it is generally left to the "wide discretion" of the sentencing court
rather than governed by specific rules. State v. Garcia, 504 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Utah
1972). It should be left to the "wide discretion" of district courts in the hearing phase of
attorney discipline, and ultimately the Supreme Court as it reviews the results of the
hearing for correctness.
e. MR. CRAWLEY'S MISCONDUCT IS AMENABLE TO CORRECTION
AND HE HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CORRECT IT.
Petitioner next argues that probation should only be available for misconduct that
is amenable to correction. Inherent in any imposition of probation is the determination
that the misconduct is amenable to correction. We do not argue that probation should be
available for conduct that is not amenable to correction. We argue that Mr. Crawley's
conduct is amenable to correction. Indeed, he has subsequently taken steps to remove
himself from some of the stressors that led to his depression. He has changed his work
and eating habits and takes medication for diabetes. He has sought out professional help,
and has been ordered to continue that help as a condition of his probation.
The trial court attached several remedial and monitoring conditions to Mr.
Crawley's probation. Mr. Crawley may not engage in any litigation for an 18-month

period, may not make any appearance before any court in any capacity, and must donate
25 hours of pro bono time. Not only is his behavior amenable to correction, under the
district court's disposition of this case his behavior will be guided under the watchful eye
of the Office of Professional Conduct.
f. OPC S SUGGESTION THAT PROBATION NEVER BE ALLOWED IN
CASES OF INTENTIONAL MISCONDUCT IS UNREASONABLE AND
UNFOUNDED.
In its brief, Petitioner cited many cases from different jurisdictions that offer "a
useful perspective on probation as a disciplinary sanction." Petitioner's Brief p. 15.
While many of those cases involved intentional misconduct, various supreme courts
could impose probation. In re Jantz, 763 P.2d 626 (Kan. 1998) (Petitioner withdrew
approximately $8500 from client trust account and received probation); In re Butler, 921
P.2d 401 (Ore. 1996) (Court might have granted probation to attorney who committed
intentional acts of misconduct if attorney had showed sufficient nexus between mental
problems and the conduct); In re McCallum, 289 N.W.2d 146 (Minn. 1980) (attorney
failed to file income tax returns but was still granted probation because mental and
physical ailments contributed to this failure); In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627, 634 (D.C. 1989)
(Probation is the best remedy where an attorney knowingly and intentionally
misrepresented the status of his client's case to that client).
To support this position the OPC discusses how seriously the Court treats matters
involving an attorney's lack of integrity. If the misconduct committed by Mr. Crawley
actually demonstrated that he fundamentally lacked integrity, probation might not be
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appropriate. Petitioner also cites several particularly egregious Utah cases where
attorneys were disciplined following intentional acts. In re Cassity, 875 P.2d 548 (Utah
1994), involves an attorney knowingly making various dishonest statements. The specific
language of Justice Zimmerman, quoted by Petitioner, references an alleged, but
uncharged, agreement with his clients to falsely represent important facts to the court. Id.
at 551; Petitioner's Brief p.28. In re Norton, 146 P.2d 899 (Utah 1944) and7« re Bybee,
629 P.2d 423 (Utah 1988) also involve deliberate, elaborate efforts to lie to a tribunal.
The OPC cannot honestly expect this Court to treat this case like Norton, Bybee, or
Cassity. Furthermore, they cannot expect the Court to use these cases to decide that all
acts of intentional dishonesty should result in suspension or disbarment no matter how
serious, who is being lied to, or what the mitigating circumstances. Moreover, Petitioner
has cited to no other jurisdiction that has adopted their proposed hard and fast rule.
g. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED RULE THAT PROBATION NOT BE
AVAILABLE WHERE CERTAIN AGGRAVATING FACTORS ARE
PRESENT IS ALSO AN UNREASONABLE AND UNFOUNDED RULE.
Petitioner suggests in page 28-29 of its brief that probation should also be forever
foreclosed in cases where certain aggravating factors are present. In several of the
misconduct cases cited by Petitioner where probation was imposed, inside and outside of
Utah, the respective supreme courts identified those aggravating factors and imposed
probation. Cassity, 875 P.2d at 550; In re Peek 565 A.2d at 631; In re Obert, 89 P.3d at
1180. Again, a bright line rule foreclosing probation as an option for courts in
disciplinary situations would be unwise. It would also go against the dispositions in
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those cases. This rule is not a matter of first impression; the trial court is already directed
to consider aggravating factors under Rule 3.
C.

RESPONDENT REQUESTED PROBATION, THE COURT DID NOT
GRANT PROBATION SUA SPONTE.

The OPC discusses in its brief that courts have imposed probation "sua sponte" as
a sanction. Petitioner's Brief p.21-23. It is unclear why OPC feels this is a relevant or
accurate point. Probation was not imposed sua sponte. Counsel for Mr. Crawley
requested that if the trial court decided a suspension were in order, the court also consider
staying the suspension and imposing probation. (R. at 14). Even so, there does not seem
to be a problem with "sua sponte" imposition of probation, particularly in light of trial
courts' "wide discretion" in administering the penalty phase of a trial or hearing. Garcia,
504 P.2d at 1016. It may be Petitioner's intent to suggest that runaway district court
judges are granting probation too frequently. If this is Petitioner's point, it is totally
irrelevant to this case where probation was not imposed "sua sponte." Petitioner has not
mentioned any case where a district court granted probation "sua sponte."
D.

THE COURTS ORDER OF A STAYED SUSPENSION, COUPLED
WITH PROBATION INVOLVING TOUGH CONDITIONS, WAS
APPROPRIATE.

In light of the factors in Rule 3 of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, a
one year stayed suspension plus probation was an appropriate sanction. Mr. Crawley
stipulated to the facts establishing that he violated the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The district court considered factors in mitigation and aggravation and determined this
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sentence would appropriately protect the public. The court relied on many factors and
did not list one as being the most important factor.
It is not unprecedented for a court to consider a respondent's cooperative attitude
during a disciplinary proceeding. In Cassity the district court noted,
"Cassity's cooperative attitude in the proceedings. The panel specifically noted
that he had voluntarily surrendered incriminating documents to the Bar pursuant to
a discovery request."
875 P.2d at 550. Though the Supreme Court does not explicitly rely on this mitigating
factor, it also did not disapprove of it. Other supreme courts have considered a
respondent's candor to a tribunal as a mitigating factor. In re Maruello, 582 A.2d 622,
624 (N.J. 1990) (Observing that district court treated candor as a mitigating factor);
Attorney Grievance Com 'n of Maryland v. Mininsohn, 846 A.2d 353, 375 (Md. 2004)
("The hearing court found several mitigating factors, with which this Court agrees: [1]
the respondent's candor ..."). Of course this Court is free to draw different inferences
from that of the trial court, but no rules prevent this Court from treating candor as a
mitigating factor. See, Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, Rule 6.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The rules suggested by Petitioner should not be adopted. They are unwise,
unsupported by any legal standard, and have not been adopted in any jurisdiction.
Regardless of the standard used to determine appropriate discipline, a stayed suspension
plus probation is an appropriate disposition for this case. It provides protection to the
public and the legal system and is also the best solution for Mr. Crawley.

DATED this 2 l day of October, 2006.
SKORDAS, CASTON & HYDE

^z,

G. Skordas
Rel5ls$ca\C. Hyde
AttoijneysNfor Respondent
\
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